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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (2.5)
THOUGHT-SPACES, SPIRITUAL PRACTICES AND
THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF TA’WĪ L
SARAH PESSIN
In Reason Unbound, Mohammad Azadpur provides an engaging and thoughtprovoking study of medieval Islamic philosophy, finding in the pages of such thinkers
as Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes grounds for dissolving a number of problematic
modern philosophical dualisms between intellect and imagination, imagination and
spiritual practice, intellect and spiritual practice, and philosophy and mysticism.
In reflecting on Azadpur’s project, I offer three considerations:
First, I address Azadpur’s opening question of Orientialism, and ask us to put that
into conversation with his closing consideration of Corbin’s critique of Aquinas’
critique of Avicenna. In particular, I ask us to consider the possibility that there is a
tacit Christian (Thomist or other) orientation to the Western Academic “thought
space” that can limit the way we read texts and tell the history of philosophy within
the Western academy. Thinking more broadly about the question of limiting lenses, I
also question the role of Heidegger in Azadpur’s project.
Next, I examine Azadpur’s classification of spiritual practices throughout his
project and I ask for clarification about the precise nature of and relationship between
such practices in medieval Islamic philosophy.
Lastly, I address a prima facie difference between Azadpur and Corbin on
symbolic transformation’s relation to reason, highlighting what appear to be their two
competing senses of ta’wīl (the interpretive act of “returning a text to its origin”
which Azadpur addresses throughout his study).
1. FROM ORIENTALISM TO AQUINAS?: APPROACHING ISLAMIC
PHILOSOPHY FROM WITHIN THE WESTERN “THOUGHT SPACE”
In the opening pages to his study, Azadpur reflects with Muhsin Mahdi and Edward
Said on a problematic sense of Orientalism according to which Islam “has been
fundamentally misrepresented in the West” (Said 1979, 272) itself as a result of
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…Orientalist discourse [being] the systematic academic discipline of dominating,
controlling, and managing the so-called Orient for the sake of the Western
imperial political agenda…. (Azadpur 2011, 1)

Said goes on to describe:
…a dynamic exchange between individual authors and the large political
concerns shared by the three great empires—British, French, and American—in
whose intellectual territory [various Islamic writings] were produced. (Said 1979,
14-15)

Along these lines, Azadpur highlights Mahdi’s further elaboration that
Oriental studies of Islam and Islamic civilization have been founded on a mixed
bag of religious, cultural, ideological, ethnic (in some cases even racist) and
scientific prejudgments and practical political interests. (Mahdi 1990, 96)

Azadpur adds Mahdi’s further sense that studies of Islam have been “guided by
irrational motives and political interests” (Mahdi 1990, 96).
It is partly in way of counteracting this kind of trend in the study of Islam that
Azadpur puts forth his own study of medieval Islamic philosophy, in particular
following through on Mahdi’s own hint that a close study of “pre-modern” Islamic
rationalism can lead us to a more integrated and complete sense of “reason.”
At the very end of his project, Azadpur turns to Corbin’s critique of Aquinas’
rejection of the Islamic philosophical theory of Active Intellect. Corbin reads
Aquinas’ critique through a religious lens, unpacking Aquinas’ dissatisfaction with
Avicenna in terms of Aquinas’ own tacit Christian sense that it is the church—not a
cosmic separate intellect—which mediates between God and human being. Corbin in
this way contrasts a personal sense of salvation at the (tacit) core of Avicenna’s
Islamic theory of Active Intellect with a more social sense of salvation—rooted in
Catholic views on the church—at the (tacit) core of Aquinas’ rejection of Avicenna’s
theory of Active Intellect.
While Azadpur does not overtly ask his reader to link together this closing
consideration with his opening reflection on Orientalism, I wonder if there is an
important link here worth considering. Leaving aside Mahdi’s and Said’s political
approach (i.e. their sense that misreadings of Islam are rooted in political interests
with political implications), here I ask us simply to consider the possibility that
certain Christian conceptual schemata have (at least at times) exerted tacit influence
over the way that many of us read texts within the Western academy, including the
way that many of us read and interpret medieval Islamic philosophy. I have in mind a
certain Thomist methodology (practiced tacitly—or overtly—by some scholars and
students) according to which a text of Islamic philosophy is criticized (or, is
approached in a negative critical spirit) simply because (a) it is a text that was
critiqued by Aquinas, or even because (b) it is a text that is not identical to Thomas’
own writings. The worry here is not that some Thomists don’t like Avicenna as much
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as they like Aquinas; the worry here is that sometimes these scholars wind up writing
versions of the history of philosophy that are informed by such preferences (without
expressly stating that they are informed by such preferences), and then the students
and other scholars who read these materials wind up being tacitly disposed to
approaching Avicenna with some general sense that his philosophy is wrong. In this
way, a lens of failure is tacitly applied to a text of Islamic philosophy, making it
impossible for neutral readings and interpretations of these texts to take place.
Prompted by Azadpur’s bookending his Reason Unbound with critiques of
Orientalism and Aquinas, we might ask: Is it possible that Islamic philosophical
concepts are sometimes overlaid by Thomist intuitions? Is it possible that textual
misreadings (leading to misrepresentations) can occur when scholars and students
tacitly (or overtly) approach texts of Islamic metaphysics already convinced that
Aquinas’ metaphysics are better?
My concern about the possible interference of Western methodological lenses in
the study of Islam also leads me to question Azadpur’s own recourse to Heidegger in
the project: While the introduction of Heidegger allows Azadpur to engage readers of
medieval Islamic philosophy with questions of human authenticity, it does seem—as
seen even in Azadpur’s emphasis on Corbin’s own surpassing of Heidegger—that
Heidegger is perhaps very much a lens that Islamic philosophy can do without. To be
sure, Azadpur invokes Heidegger to help us approach Islamic philosophy: Azadpur
uses Heidegger to help us focus on self’s authentic move away from the “them” to the
space in which things reveal themselves, itself linked by Azadpur to phronesis in
Islamic philosophy. That said, Azadpur also emphasizes that Corbin dramatically
goes beyond (and in this sense, we may say, goes against) Heidegger in replacing the
end term of “being towards death” with the end term of “being towards beyond
death” (35-7). But after introducing Corbin’s own religious modification (and in some
strong sense, rejection) of key elements of Heidegger, it seems that Azadpur might
not even want to invoke Heideggerian ideas as any kinds of benchmarks against
which to measure Islamic philosophy; for in the context of Corbin’s rejection of a key
Heideggerian insight, it seems that to the extent that something is truly Heideggerian,
it will be devoid of precisely the kind of religious spirit that Azadpur’s study is out to
capture. In that light, perhaps it would be best for Azadpur to resist the Western
academic temptation to use Heidegger at all in his project. Perhaps Azadpur’s picture
of Islamic philosophy, as rationalism-with-spiritual-practice, is precisely a picture
which does not shine brighter through Heideggerian analysis; perhaps Islamic
philosophy has more to offer Heidegger than vice versa, in which case we must ask
Azadpur: Why invoke Heidegger in this project at all?
2. ON THE NATURE AND KINDS OF SPIRITUAL PRACTICE
I turn next to Azadpur’s discussion of spiritual practices. One of the key goals of the
project is to show the intimate link between philosophy (as an exercise of knowledge)
and spiritual transformation. Extending Hadot’s reading of ancient philosophy into
the Islamic philosophical realm, Azadpur argues for Islamic rationalism as more than
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just narrow theory construction or dry, disembodied knowledge acquisition; rather,
Azadpur shows how in the very contours of their acts of mind philosophers such as
Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes are able to manifest a rich engagement with deep
wisdom, and as such, deep theological devotion.
Reading Reason Unbound, one can find at least five different senses of ‘spiritual
practice’. It is worth thinking more about how these all work together for Azadpur, as
it is worth thinking more about whether one (or more) is the more primary sense of
‘spiritual practice’ that Azadpur has in mind.
1) - 2) The first two senses of ‘spiritual practice’ are related to two different
ethical points of emphasis, viz. (a) the importance of ethical training as preparatory
for philosophizing, and (b) the Aristotelian notion of phronesis – a particularly
context-sensitive (and as such, not simply theoretical) focus on ethics. Highlighting
the first ethical emphasis, Azadpur notes:
According to Avicenna, the ethical training of the philosopher provides a gateway to the
intellectual fulfillment of the individual by curtailing the appetites and passions…. (59)

Highlighting the second ethical emphasis, Azadpur goes on to explain that in so
curtailing the appetites and passions, ethical training allows the soul
to achieve practical wisdom (i.e., to recognize the objective good and act for the sake of
it). The practically wise soul perceives the relevant moral intentions enmattered in a
situation and engages in action for their sake, rather than for the sake of values imposed
on one’s actions external to that situation. Therefore, practical wisdom results in actions
that have as their ends the unconditional good perceived in that situation of action.… (59;
see too 76)

While Azadpur is clear on how the ethical training leads to the phronesis, I would
ask him to clarify whether the initial training or the resulting phronesis is more
properly illustrative of the spiritual practice that he has in mind when he emphasizes
that Islamic rationalism is itself deeply tied up with spiritual practice.
I would also ask Azadpur to clarify how the ethical training and phronesis connect
up with Islamic Law. To the extent that this ethical training is linked to the guidelines
for living prescribed by Islamic Law (as emphasized, for example, in his analysis of
Averroes at page 92), does this not in some sense trump the Aristotelian emphasis on
phronesis? In other words, if the source of the ethical training is itself a divinely
revealed Islamic Law, does that not put a kind of Divine Command Theory at the
foundation, and does such a foundation not risk overshadowing the fluidity of
Aristotelian phronesis with a more rigid mode of “following God’s law”? How would
Azadpur advise us to think of revealed Islamic Law in a way that avoids having it (a)
overshadow the fluid sense of an “ethical spiritual practice” with a system of rulefollowing, and (b) overshadow the very notion of rationalism with faithful devotion to
a set of revealed guidelines?
3) A third sense of ‘spiritual practice’ seems to emerge from the integration of
imaginative and intellectual endeavors, a point highlighted throughout the project but
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seen succinctly in Azadpur’s pointing to Mahdi’s identification of the “harmony of
the rational and imaginative aspects of the human life” as having “spiritual
dimensions” (4). If we focus on the integration of imaginative and intellectual
endeavors (as Azadpur shows is the spirit of a range of Islamic rationalists), do we
have the core of the spiritual exercise, or just a spiritual byproduct of the above
ethical preparations and / or outcomes? In other words: Does Azadpur see the
integration of imagination and intellect as the core of the spiritual practice in Islamic
rationalism, or are one or more of the above ethical points of emphasis the crux of
what makes an Islamic rationalist’s rationalism a spiritual practice (with the
integration of imagination and intellect either as preparatory for one or more of the
above ethical-as-spiritual modes of being, or perhaps as just an outcome of one or
more of the above ethical-as-spiritual modes of being)?
4) A fourth sense of ‘spiritual practice’ seems linked to the philosopher’s (or
prophet’s) ability to come closer to God’s own reality through various activities of
intellect and imagination. Is the capacity to draw nearer to God (or perhaps to God’s
truth) the core of what, for Azadpur, makes the Islamic rationalist’s rationalism a
spiritual practice, or is ethics (in one or both of the above mentioned senses) more
primarily the marker of the spiritual practice? In other words, which is more
foundationally a case in point of the kind of spiritual exercise that Azadpur has in
mind: the phenomenology of experiencing God’s reality or the reality of being
ethically engaged in the marketplace with other people?
5) Lastly, a fifth sense of ‘spiritual practice’ seems linked to the exegetical
activity of ta’wīl. I end with some further questions about ta’wīl below, but for here, I
would ask how this exegetical activity fits in with the other elements already
mentioned in connection with rationalism as spiritual practice: Is ta’wīl preparatory
for and / or an end-product of one or more of the above spiritual practices?
3. SYMBOLIC SPACES OF THE TA’WĪL: AZADPUR AND CORBIN ON
TRANSFORMATION AND REASON
Closing our reflections on Azadpur’s study, we turn to the ta’wīl, and in particular, to
Corbin’s sense of that activity as a transformative opening to a renewed self. As
Azadpur shows in his study, Corbin has a unique phenomenological and
hermeneutical approach to human subjectivity. Along these very lines, Corbin (in his
study of what he calls Avicenna’s “visionary recitals”) describes the hermeneutical
possibilities in the very act of textual exegesis in terms of a reader being transformed
through an encounter with the symbolic, mythic, imaginative space of a text (Corbin
1960). Upholding this kind of “symbolic” (as opposed to allegorical) approach to
Avicenna’s “recitals,” Corbin seems precisely to see Avicenna as moving beyond
philosophical engagement to a spiritual self-awakening beyond intellect. In this spirit,
Corbin classifies these works as Avicenna’s transformational-spiritual writings, and
he explains how such writings employ image, imagination and symbol to open onto
an experiential reorientation that goes beyond the confines of reason. Since, for
Corbin, this transformation is precisely not a function of intellectually moving from
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symbol to idea, and since, as such, for Corbin the ultimate spiritual transformation
seems linked to a state of being beyond reason, I wonder if Azadpur’s own sense of
Islamic-rationalism-as-spiritual-practice might have a more robust sense of intellect’s
role (in harmony with imagination) than can be found in Corbin’s own analysis.
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